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Written by Jordan Richard Schoenherr, Assistant Professor, Psychology, Concordia University

Along with the recent reciprocal drone strikes by Iran and the United States in Syria, Russia continues to unleash its arsenal on Ukrainian civilian and military targets alike. While the Russian armies have started using outdated weapons, novel technologies remain the objects of fascination on the battlefield.

Hypersonic missiles and nuclear weapons have understandably grabbed media attention. However, drone warfare continues to occupy a central role in the conflict.

Ukraine’s not the only battlefield. Drone warfare has played a significant role in the Azerbaijan-Armenian conflict, with Armenia’s superior conventional forces being challenged by the kamikaze drones, strike UAVs and remotely controlled planes of Azerbaijan. A world away, China’s drones continue to test Taiwan’s defensive capabilities and readiness.

Drones are not the only weapons. As the global Summit on Responsible AI in the Military Domain (REAIM) illustrates, there is a growing recognition that lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) pose a threat that must be reckoned with.

Understanding this threat requires grasping the psychological, social and technological challenges they present.

Killing and psychological distance

Psychology is at the heart of all conflicts. Whether in terms of perceived existential or territorial threats, individuals band together in groups to make gains or avoid losses.

A reluctance to kill stems from our perceived humanity and membership in the same community. By turning people into statistics and dehumanizing them, we further dull our moral sense.

LAWS remove us from the battlefield. As we distance ourselves from human suffering, lethal decisions become easier. Research has demonstrated that distance is also associated with more antisocial behaviours. When viewing potential targets from drone-like perspectives, people become morally disengaged.

A young man stands with out-stretched arms with a drone in the sky in front of him.
A young man flies a drone while testing it on the outskirts of Kyiv, Ukraine, in June 2022. Drones are being extensively used by Russian and Ukrainian troops.
(AP Photo/Natacha Pisarenko)

Autonomy, intelligence differ

Many modern weapons rely on artificial intelligence (AI), but not all forms of AI are autonomous. Autonomy and intelligence are two distinct characteristics.

Autonomy has to do with control over specific operations. A weapons system might gather information and identify a target autonomously, while firing decisions are left to human operators. Alternatively, a human operator might decide on a target, releasing a self-guided weapon to target and detonate autonomously.

Autonomous weapons are not new to warfare. In the sea, self-propelled torpedos and naval mines have been in use since the mid-1800s. On the ground, elementary land mines have given way to autonomous turrets.

In the air, Nazi Germany wielded V1 and V2 rockets and radio-controlled munitions. Heat-seeking and laser-guided precisions followed by the 1960s and were used by the U.S. in Vietnam. By the 1990s, the era of “smart weapons” was upon us, bringing with it questions of our ethical obligations.

Contemporary LAWS have been framed as the “natural evolutionary path” of warfare. We can draw parallels between single drones and smart weapons, although drone swarms represent a new kind of weapon.

Dozens of drones fly over a line of trees.
Drone swarms are a new and lethal weapon of war.
(Shutterstock)

The ability to co-ordinate their actions gives them the potential to overwhelm human forces. The degree of co-ordination, in fact, requires a higher level of autonomy. If the swarm is sufficiently large, a single human operator could not hope to maintain sufficient situational awareness to control it.

By ceding lethal decisions to LAWS, their accuracy and reliability become paramount concerns.

Accuracy and accountability

The potential for reduced human error is often used to recommend LAWS. While an actuarial approach to AI ethics is hardly the best or only way to make moral decisions about AI, reliable data is essential to judge the accuracy and improve the operations of LAWS. However, it is often lacking.

A review of U.S. drone strikes over a 15-year period suggested that only about 20 per cent of more than 700 strikes were acknowledged by the government, with an estimated 400 civilian casualties.

In the early stages of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, reports suggested that Ukrainians destroyed about 85 per cent of the drones launched against them. In the most recent attacks, they have destroyed more than 75 per cent of the drones.

These statistics might suggest drones aren’t particularly effective. But the minimal cost and large numbers of drones mean that even if a small proportion of the weapons are successful, the damage and casualties can be significant.

When assigning responsibility, we have to consider who manufactures these weapons. They are not always homegrown. Drones used by Russia in the Ukrainian conflict hail from China and Iran.

Inside these drones, many parts come from western manufacturers. Understanding responsibility and accountability in conflicts requires that we consider the international supply chains that enable LAWS.

Can LAWS be outlawed?

Whether LAWS represent a unique threat to human rights that must be banned — like landmines — or otherwise controlled by international laws, there is widespread agreement that we must re-evaluate existing approaches to regulation.

REAIM’s work is not alone in attempting to regulate LAWS. The United Nations, multilateral proposals and countries like the U.S. and Canada have all developed, proposed or are reviewing the sufficiency of existing standards.

Two soldiers dressed in battle fatigues look at a screen in an outdoor shelter.
Ukrainian servicemen correct artillery fire by drone at the frontline near Kharkiv, Ukraine, in July 2022.
(AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka)

These efforts face an array of practical issues. In many cases, the principles are framed as best practices and viewed as voluntary rather than being enforceable. States might also be reluctant in order to ensure consistency with their allies.

Treaties and regulations also create social dilemmas — just as they do when contemplating cyberweapons, nations must decide whether they adhere to the rules while others develop superior capabilities.

Even if LAWS are wholly or partially banned, there is still considerable room for interpretation and rationalization.

In July 2022, Russia said responsibility lies with their operators and that LAWS can “reduce the risk of intentional strikes against civilians and civilian facilities” and support “missions of maintaining or restoring international peace and security … [in] compliance with international law.” These are hollow statements made by a hollow regime.

No matter how elegant the regulatory framework nor how straightforward the principles, adversarial nations are unlikely to abide by international agreements — especially knowing weapons like drones make it easier for soldiers psychologically removed from the realities of the battlefield to kill others.

As Russia’s war in Ukraine illustrates, by reframing conflicts, the use of LAWS can always be justified. Their ability to desensitize their users from the act of killing, however, must not be.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Written by Roodabeh Dehghani, PhD candidate, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of Ottawa

Since the death of Mahsa (Jina) Amini in September 2022, much has been said and written about the protests in Iran. Amini died while in the custody of Iran’s morality police. She was arrested for supposedly wearing her hijab incorrectly.

Her death triggered widespread protests against the morality police, the government and a host of other issues facing the country. A recurrent theme of discussion surrounding the protest movement has focused on its so-called secular nature.

Why ‘secularism’ is problematic

In December 2022 TIME magazine published a piece written by Iranian-American writer Azadeh Moaveni who characterized the uprising in Iran as educated, liberal and secular. Other commentators have pointed out that protesters have not used religious slogans. This differentiates this protest movement from previous ones. It is secular in nature and therefore, historically significant.

In January 2023 I attended a symposium at the University of Toronto called Women, Life, Liberty: Iran’s democratic future in which the protests were described by some commentators as secular. For example, in one of the panels called A Charter of Rights for a Democratic and Pluralistic Iran, secularism was described as one of the common demands of the Iranian people whether they joined the street protests or not.

A woman face away from the camera stands in front of a burning tire and raises her hand and makes a victory sign.

Mahsa Amini’s death has triggered nation-wide protests in Iran against the government.
(AP Photo/Middle East Images)

These kinds of statements are meant to demonstrate the extent to which the political regime is rejected by Iranians. The assumption underpinning this narrative is that the government’s ideology stands in opposition to the secular views of most Iranians.

One of the most important, and challenging, narratives on secularism is the belief that European secularism is a global tendency, and that secularism is incompatible with religion.

In the West, secularism is closely tied to the removal of religion from public spaces, and the decline in its influence on social and behavioural practices. For example, in France, the government has created a new Forum on Islam to reshape Islam in the country. The forum is made up of Muslim figures handpicked by the government. Examples like these are not about a separation of the state from religion. Rather they are about increasing the state’s control over religion and religious institutions.

However, using the term secularism, especially in this sense, does not necessarily help us understand what is happening in Iran today. These narratives are often based on conventional meaning of secularism. Consequently, they do not necessarily resonate well with the views and demands of Iranian people.

Rejecting state control of religion

The protests in Iran are about rejecting the state’s regulation of religiosity in public life, and not about rejecting religion in Iranian society.

Narratives that put secularism against religiosity contrast with the images and chants that have emerged from the protests in Iran. In November 2022 one video clip from the protests showed women in chadors marching on the streets chanting “Go ahead for revolution with or without hijab.” Western conceptions of secularism cannot explain images of chador-wearing women taking part in protests against the Iranian government.

But views on secularism in Iran vary considerably. Political scientist Nader Hashemi argues that the desire for secularism has emerged within the civil society among intellectuals, Iranian youth and the urban middle class who are disillusioned with the government.

A woman in a face mask and sunglasses carries a sign that reads: women life freedom

The protests in Iran are about rejecting the state’s regulation of religion and not about rejecting religion in Iranian society.
(AP Photo/Middle East Images)

Iranian-American writer Dina Nayeri and others have argued that there is a decline of religious beliefs and practices among Iranians. In other words, that Iran is undergoing a process of secularization.

On the other hand, sociologist Abdolmohammad Kazemipur suggested that the state has gone through a secularization process for pragmatic reasons. He states that in post-revolution Iran, the state itself has moved to a more secular political philosophy as a pragmatic response to political pressures.

The types of people and groups that have been involved in the protests suggest that the movement transcends debates around secularism versus religion. The protests were sparked by the morality police’s treatment of Amini. But many other issues have been raised by protesters including corruption, alarming unemployment, failed international policies and oppression of minorities.

Protests have also taken place in Sistan and Baluchestan, a southeastern province populated by many Sunnis. Those protests have received support from the local Sunni Imam Molavi Abdolhamid.

A recent study shows considerable change in Iranians’ religiosity. Around 40 per cent of the participants still self-identified as Muslim and 78 per cent said they believed in God. The study also showed that 72 per cent of participants are against mandatory hijab laws.

Religion still remains an important dimension of Iranian life. And religious segments of Iranian society have been expressing their solidarity with the protests.

How can we make sense of these facts about the situation in Iran? Secularism as a label cannot fully explain the ongoing situation in Iran. Instead, the protest movement in Iran is a rejection of the state’s control over how people express their religious beliefs.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Written by Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Baker Institute Fellow for Kuwait, Rice University

The fact that Saudi Arabia entered a rapprochement deal with Iran and chose China to broker it came as a surprise to many international observers.

The agreement, officially called the Joint Trilateral Statement, was signed in Beijing on March 11 and begins the process of restoring diplomatic ties between Riyadh and Tehran. Those ties were severed in January 2016 after protesters stormed the Saudi Embassy in Iran in the aftermath of the execution of Nimr al-Nimr, a prominent Saudi Shiite cleric who had criticized Saudi treatment of its Shiite minority.

As an analyst of Saudi foreign policy, I’ve seen how the kingdom’s decision to engage in this way with Iran and China is part of a broader diversification of the kingdom’s international relationships that has unfolded over the past decade. To close observers of geopolitical trends in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, the China-brokered deal fits into a pattern.

From being firmly a part of the anti-communist camp during the Cold War and closely tied into U.S.-led regional security networks in the Persian Gulf, Saudi foreign policy is now taking a nonaligned stance that has become increasingly consequential for how Saudi Arabia pursues its interests.

Saudis question US partnership

The relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia is often said to revolve around an oil-for-security dynamic in which the Saudis provide the former and the U.S. the latter.

In reality, ties have spanned a far wider spectrum than that and have been more complicated, with periods of high tension – stemming from events such as Saudi participation in the Arab oil embargo in 1973, or the involvement of Saudi citizens in the Sept. 11 terrorism attacks in 2001.

But since the Arab Spring protests in the early 2010s, U.S.-Saudi relations have frayed, both in Riyadh and in Washington. The perception among Gulf leaders that the Obama administration abandoned former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak during the Egyptian revolution in 2011 left them deeply rattled. They feared that the U.S. could abandon them just as it had done Mubarak, a longtime partner of 30 years.

This was compounded by the Gulf states’ exclusion from U.S. negotiations with Iran, initially in secret bilateral talks in 2013 and subsequently as part of the P5+1 framework of the U.N. Security Council permanent members, plus Germany, which culminated in the Iran nuclear deal in 2015.

And then in 2019, a missile and drone attack on Saudi oil infrastructure temporarily knocked out half the kingdom’s production. The attacks were linked, but never formally attributed, to Iran. President Donald Trump responded by declaring it had been an attack on Saudi Arabia, not on the U.S., drawing a distinction between their interests. Trump’s remarks, and subsequent inaction, caused shockwaves in Riyadh and other Gulf capitals as leaders began to question U.S. credibility as a reliable regional partner.

Finally, in 2021, the chaotic nature of the U.S. withdrawal from Kabul, Afghanistan, served to reinforce deeply-rooted perceptions about U.S. disengagement from the Middle East, irrespective of the situation in reality.

Saudi men walk down hallway past an exhibition with digital screens
The Saudi Vision 2030 program aims to build large-scale tourism, infrastructure, recreation and other projects to diversify the kingdom’s economy.
Fayez Nureldine/AFP via Getty Images

Pivot to booming China

It is against this backdrop of pragmatic acknowledgment of its own vulnerabilities to regional and global tensions – and entrenched uncertainty about the role of the U.S. as a long-term partner – that Saudi Arabia began to broaden its international relationships, with particular attention on China.

Officials across the Gulf believe China will replace the U.S. as the dominant economic and energy superpower in the 21st century. For more than a decade, a majority of oil and gas from the six Gulf monarchies has flowed east to Asia in quantities that far exceed the cargoes heading west to Europe and North America.

In a further sign of deepening bilateral ties, in December 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Saudi Arabia to sign investment agreements across 34 sectors, ranging from green energy and information technology to construction and logistics.

Moving toward reconciliation with Iran

Meanwhile, the Saudi outreach to Iran has been more than three years in the making.

It began after the 2019 oil attacks and focused initially on de-escalating regional tensions. Saudi and Iranian officials held five rounds of dialogue in Iraq between 2020 and 2022 to try to bridge the issues that divided them. These meetings formed the backdrop to the China-brokered deal in Beijing.

Reports have suggested that Saudi Arabia’s King Salman has invited Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi to the kingdom, possibly during Ramadan, the Muslim holy month that began on March 22. Any such visit would indicate a political will on both sides to move beyond the two decades of rancor and acrimony that followed the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and doomed an earlier phase of Saudi-Iranian rapprochement at the turn of the century.

A Saudi reconciliation with Iran would undermine attempts by the U.S. and Israel to increase Iran’s international isolation and is consistent with a Saudi desire to de-escalate regional tensions. This is particularly the case as Vision 2030, a plan to diversify the Saudi economy beyond oil revenue, reaches its halfway stage and begins to implement the infrastructure and tourism giga-projects associated with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Launched in 2016, Vision 2030 has struggled to attract international buy-in, in part due to investor concerns about regional insecurity and its spillover into Saudi Arabia.

Balancing act on Ukraine

Saudia Arabia’s unwillingness to take sides in great power competition is also evident in policy responses to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Saudi Arabia, as well as the United Arab Emirates, has resisted pressure to take sides in an era of strategic rivalries. One manifestation of this balancing act has been the Saudi decision to work with Russia within the framework of the oil producers group OPEC+ – and at the same time engage with U.S. officials over issues of oil output and prices.

The Saudi deal with Iran and choice of China as an intermediary is consistent with a deeper shift in Saudi foreign policy, which has been evident for some time. By adapting to changing circumstances, Mohammed bin Salman is looking to Saudi Arabia’s future and trying to strike a wider balance of power in what he sees as an eventual “post-American” Gulf.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Written by Jose Caballero, Senior Economist, IMD World Competitiveness Center, International Institute for Management Development (IMD)

China’s billions of dollars in global investments and infrastructure projects seem to be paying off politically and economically.

Just recently, Honduras signalled it is set to cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan, having been one of the few remaining countries to recognise the island as a state. This switch of allegiances would be a coup for China, which sees Taiwan as part of its jurisdiction, but also a sign of diminishing US power in Latin America, since the US is a long-time supporter of Taiwan.

China’s influence seems to be everywhere. Days before Chinese president Xi Jinping flew into Moscow to discuss the Ukraine war with Russia’s Vladimir Putin, China had brokered a deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

The high-profile deal sought to re-establish diplomatic, trade and security relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia in an effort to de-escalate tensions and bring more stability to the Middle East. The agreement transforms the nature of China’s involvement in the region from one purely driven by commercial interests into a security-related cooperation that can protect its growing assets and expatriate population in the region.

Commentators see the agreement as a positive step but wonder about the influence that Iran and Saudi Arabia can have in lessening the internal conflicts in several nearby countries. This is particularly where they support rival parties, including in Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. What the deal does highlight is the rising influence that China can exert and the waning of the US’s power over the Middle East regional order.

Studies have shown that political instability in neighbouring countries negatively affects the economic performance of a nation by disrupting trade flows and increasing defence expenditures while lessening investment, for example, in education. Under such conditions, economic incentives can drive a peace-building process. Peacefully resolving conflicts benefits countries not directly entangled in the disputes.




Read more:
Xi and Putin meeting signals the return of the China-Russia axis and the start of a second cold war


Since the 1990s, China has gradually become the largest trade partner of the Arab region overall and the top trade partner of Saudi Arabia. China’s exports to Saudi Arabia have annually increased at 15.3% year on year on average, amounting to US$905 million (£740 million) in 1995 and US$31.8 billion in 2020.

Meanwhile, over the same period, China’s imports from Saudi Arabia rose from US$393 million to US$33.4 billion, an average annual increase of 19.4%. In 2019, China and Saudi Arabia signed 35 trade and investments deals.

Regional power plays

Similarly, China’s exports to Iran have increased at an average 14.7% annual rate from US$276 million in 1995 to US$8.51 billion in 2020. And its imports from Iran have also risen by 14.5% annually between 1995 (US$197 million) and 2020 (US$5.85 billion).

By 2022, exports totalled US$9.44 billion and continued to grow exponentially in early 2023. Russia has recently overtaken China as the largest foreign investor in Iran, but China remains its largest oil customer.

China’s main exports to Saudi Arabia and Iran include broadcasting equipment, motor vehicles and air pumps. Its main imports are crude petroleum, ethylene polymers and acrylic alcohols.

In the context of the Saudi Arabia and Iran reconciliation, trade with China is likely to continue to follow such increasing trends. If benefits from the agreement spread to other countries in the region, China could also gain from economic relations with those countries as regional stability increases.

There is already some evidence of such positive spillover. After the agreement with the Saudis, Iran is ready to expand cooperation, hopes rapprochement with Bahrain will be possible, and is willing to improve relations with Jordan and the United Arab Emirates.

However it’s worth noting some commentators point out that previous efforts at reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia were unsuccessful, while others question whether they will adhere to the terms of the agreement.

Belt and Road

As well as investing in commercial and transport infrastructure to make trade easier, the objectives of China’s Belt and Road Initiative include the strengthening of its economic leadership and the improvement and creation of free trade blocks among countries along the investment route. The Iran-Saudi Arabia agreement will generate further benefits to China by boosting the initiative’s dividends. Saudi Arabia’s strategic location bordering eight countries not only provides an alternative route for energy supply to China but also makes it a vital partner for the initiative’s infrastructure investment, which deepens China’s presence in the Middle East.

Iran’s strategic position provides it with considerable seaport facilities and has the potential for the development of an air transportation hub. China has already invested in the development of a 2,000-mile-long railway from Xinjiang’s capital Urumqi to Tehran.

A map showing China's Belt and Road Initiative.


Shutterstock

The agreement also brings a more subtle benefit to China. With Russia at war, China needs to ensure the continuity of its energy supply to boost economic performance and safeguard socio-political stability at home. Saudi Arabia and Iran provide a strong basis for the diversification of China’s energy options and also to pre-empt any potential move by the United States to constrain its access to the Gulf’s resources.

Iran has the world’s fourth largest oil and second gas reserves. Saudi Arabia has the second largest oil reserves, accounting for 16.2% of the world’s total. Access to such vast resources in the context of a more stable region provide China with further assurances for the future flow of the energy supplies its economic growth needs.

The Iran-Saudi initiative has the potential to address China’s energy security issues and turn China into a global maritime power and a global monetary power. All of these factors will contribute to the sustainability of China’s economic growth, and add to its status as a superpower.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Written by Ronald Suny, Professor of History and Political Science, University of Michigan

Just a few days after being branded a war criminal in an international arrest warrant, Russian President Vladimir Putin was talking peace with his most important ally, Chinese president Xi Jinping.

The setting for the get-together was the late-15th-century Faceted Chamber, the ornate throne room of Muscovite grand princes and czars. The main topics of discussion were fittingly grandiose: How should hostilities in Ukraine end? And after the war is over, how should the international security system be reshaped?

The reaction of many in the West to the proposals put forward by China and discussed with Russia has been notably suspicious of intentions. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned the world not to be “fooled by any tactical move by Russia, supported by China … to freeze the war on its own terms.”

Such sentiment is understandable. Putin launched a brutal, unprovoked war in Ukraine. Amid the heightened emotional environment of missile attacks on civilians, horrific atrocities against ordinary citizens and deportation of children from Ukraine, even a cool evaluation of ways to end the fighting, declare a cease-fire, and begin talks by the belligerents has led to accusations of appeasement. And the peace plan put forward by China on Feb. 24, 2023, and discussed with Putin during a March 20-22 meeting in Moscow has been criticized as overly vague and lacking concrete suggestions.

In such circumstances, it can be difficult to consider what the interest of the other side might actually be in bringing the killing to an end, and their sincerity of any purported efforts to do so.

But as a historian, I ask, what does the world look like from the other side? How has the run-up to the war and the war itself been understood by Russia and China? And what do Xi and Putin envision a post-conflict world to look like?

Playing by the rules – but whose?

The rulers of both Russia and China see the West-dominated “rules-based international order” – a system that has dominated geopolitics since the end of the Second World War – as designed to uphold the global hegemony of the United States.

Two men are seen in the background flanked by giant China and Russian flags. Chandeliers hang overhead.
Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with China’s President Xi Jinping at the Kremlin.
Pavel Byrkin/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images)

The two men’s stated preference is for a multilateral system, one which would most probably result in a number of regional hegemons. This would include, to be sure, China and Russia holding sway in their own neighborhoods.

Xi put the matter rather gently during his Moscow trip: “The international community has recognized that no country is superior to others, no model of governance is universal, and no single country should dictate the international order. The common interest of all humankind is in a world that is united and peaceful, rather than divided and volatile.”

Reflecting his more street tough style, Putin was more blunt. Russia and China “have consistently advocated the shaping of a more just multipolar world order based on international law rather than certain ‘rules’ serving the needs of the ‘golden billion,’” he said, referencing a theory that holds that the billion people in the richest countries of the world consume the greatest portion of the world’s resources.

Continuing in this vein, Putin said the “crisis in Ukraine” was an example of the West trying to “retain its international dominance and preserve the unipolar world order” while splitting “the common Eurasian space into a network of ‘exclusive clubs’ and military blocs that would serve to contain our countries’ development and harm their interests.”

China as peacemaker?

Beijing appears intent to play the role of negotiator-in-chief in this transition to a multipolar world order.

After its success shouldering aside the United States and brokering a rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, China has turned its attention to Ukraine.

With its peace proposal on Ukraine, China has deftly established certain principles to which other nations would eagerly subscribe.

“The sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all countries must be effectively upheld. All countries, big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, are equal members of the international community,” holds the first principle in language that would be hard to object to.

But those anodyne sentences point in two directions at once. Upholding sovereignty appears, at first, to be aimed at Russia a year after it had so clearly violated the sovereignty of neighboring Ukraine. But the principle also can be read to include the conflict over Taiwan, which is recognized by Beijing and some other states as a part of China. It is perhaps no accident that the plan’s wording come as the U.S., which officially recognizes China’s claim to Taiwan, has toughened its stance, vowing to defend the island should it be invaded. To Beijing, the United States appears intent on turning a rival, China, into an enemy.

Nations, China asserts, have the right to enhance their security but not at the expense of others. This principle echoes directly one of Putin’s most frequently expressed reasons for the conflict with Ukraine: the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe and the alliance’s promise to expand further by admitting Georgia and Ukraine. In Putin’s view, such NATO encroachment is an existential threat to Russia’s security interests.

But the Chinese plan also rejects Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling: “The threat or use of nuclear weapons should be opposed.”

Meanwhile, the Chinese strongly insist on the need for an immediate cease-fire and the start of negotiations, a call that Washington vehemently rejected as a concession that amounted to “diplomatic cover for Russia to continue to commit” war crimes.

What will Russia settle for?

Russia’s aims in the Ukraine war are simple enough to dissect, though they have been reduced after the effective Ukrainian resistance to the initial invasion.

Instead of taking over all of Ukraine, and perhaps setting up a puppet government, Moscow has been forced to accept limited territorial gains in the Donbas and the coastal crescent linking both the region and Russia with Crimea. Reduced though they are, such Russian goals are completely unacceptable to Ukraine and to the Western alliance – and, indeed, to all countries that accept that principle that international borders cannot be legitimately changed unilaterally by military force.

Although not clearly spelled out, this principle is even contained in the very first sentence of the Chinese peace plan: “Universally recognized international law, including the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, must be strictly observed.”

That notwithstanding, Putin has welcomed the intervention of China and the plan in general terms.

Rival global ambitions

So what’s in this for Beijing, given that to many, the peace plan is already a non-starter?

The conflict in Ukraine is not only devastating to the two belligerents involved, but destabilizing for states around the world. In the short run, China may be benefiting from the war because it consumes attention and armaments from the West and diverts its gaze from East Asia. The U.S. “pivot to the east” – a planned refocusing from the Obama administration onward aimed at countering the perceived threat of China – has stalled.

But there is an argument that Xi is most concerned with China’s renewal of economic development, which would rely on less confrontational relations with Europe and the United States. Stability, both domestically and internationally, works to China’s economic advantage as a major producer and exporter of industrial goods. And Beijing is mindful that a slump in foreign demand and investment is hitting the country’s economic prospects.

As such, Beijing’s new role as peacemaker – whether in the Middle East or Eastern Europe – may indeed be sincere. Further, Xi may be the only person on the globe able to persuade Putin to think seriously about a way out of war.

Standing in the way of peace, however, is not only the current intransigence of Russia and Ukraine. The United States’ long-held foreign policy aim of maintaining its “indispensable nation” status runs counter to Russia and China’s ambition to end American global dominance.

It presents two, seemingly insurmountable, rival ambitions.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Written by Richard Forno, Principal Lecturer in Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, University of Maryland, Baltimore County

The Biden administration released its first National Cybersecurity Strategy on March 2, 2023. The last version was issued in 2018 during the Trump administration.

As the National Security Strategy does for national defense, the National Cybersecurity Strategy outlines a president’s priorities regarding cybersecurity issues. The document is not a directive. Rather, it describes in general terms what the administration is most concerned about, who its major adversaries are and how it might achieve its goals through legislation or executive action. These types of strategy statements are often aspirational.

As expected, the 2023 Biden National Cybersecurity Strategy reiterates previous recommendations about how to improve American cybersecurity. It calls for improved sharing of information between the government and private sector about cybersecurity threats, vulnerabilities and risks. It prescribes coordinating cybersecurity incident response across the federal government and enhancing regulations. It describes the need to expand the federal cybersecurity workforce. It emphasizes the importance of protecting the country’s critical infrastructure and federal computer systems. And it identifies China, Russia, Iran and North Korea as America’s main adversaries in cyberspace.

However, as a former cybersecurity industry practitioner and current cybersecurity researcher, I think that the 2023 document incorporates some fresh ideas and perspectives that represent a more holistic approach to cybersecurity. At the same time, though, some of what is proposed may not be as helpful as envisioned.

Some of the key provisions in the current National Cybersecurity Strategy relate to the private sector, both in terms of product liability and cybersecurity insurance. It also aims to reduce the cybersecurity burden on individuals and smaller organizations. However, I believe it doesn’t go far enough in fostering information-sharing or addressing the specific tactics and techniques used by attackers.

Acting National Cybersecurity Director Kemba Walden discusses the Biden administration’s National Cybersecurity Strategy.

The end of vendor indemnification?

For decades, the technology industry has operated under what is known as “shrink-wrap” licensing. This refers to the multiple pages of legal text that customers, both large and small, routinely are forced to accept before installing or using computer products, software and services.

While much has been written about these agreements, such licenses generally have one thing in common: They ultimately protect vendors such as Microsoft or Adobe from legal consequences for any damages or costs arising from a customer’s use of their products, even if the vendor is at fault for producing a flawed or insecure product that affects the end user.

In a groundbreaking move, the new cybersecurity strategy says that while no product is totally secure, the administration will work with Congress and the private sector to prevent companies from being shielded from liability claims over the security of their products. These products underpin most of modern society.

Removing that legal shield is likely to encourage companies to make security a priority in their product development cycles and have a greater stake in the reliability of their products beyond the point of sale.

In another noteworthy shift, the strategy observes that end users bear too great a burden for mitigating cybersecurity risks. It states that a collaborative approach to cybersecurity and resiliency “cannot rely on the constant vigilance of our smallest organizations and individual citizens.” It stresses the importance of manufacturers of critical computer systems, as well as companies that operate them, in taking a greater role in improving the security of their products. It also suggests expanded regulation toward that goal may be forthcoming.

Interestingly, the strategy places great emphasis on the threat from ransomware as the most pressing cybercrime facing the U.S. at all levels of government and business. It now calls ransomware a national security threat and not simply a criminal matter.

Backstopping cyber insurance

The new strategy also directs the federal government to consider taking on some responsibility for so-called cybersecurity insurance.

Here, the administration wants to ensure that insurance companies are adequately funded to respond to claims following a significant or catastrophic cybersecurity incident. Since 2020, the market for cybersecurity-related insurance has grown nearly 75%, and organizations of all sizes consider such policies necessary.

This is understandable given how many companies and government agencies are reliant on the internet and corporate networks to conduct daily operations. By protecting, or “backstopping,” cybersecurity insurers, the administration hopes to prevent a major systemic financial crisis for insurers and victims during a cybersecurity incident.

However, cybersecurity insurance should not be treated as a free pass for complacency. Thankfully, insurers now often require policyholders to prove they are following best cybersecurity practices before approving a policy. This helps protect them from issuing policies that are likely to face claims arising from gross negligence by policyholders.

Looking forward

In addition to dealing with present concerns, the strategy also makes a strong case for ensuring the U.S. is prepared for the future. It speaks about fostering technology research that can improve or introduce cybersecurity in such fields as artificial intelligence, critical infrastructure and industrial control systems.

The strategy specifically warns that the U.S. must be prepared for a “post-quantum future” where emerging technologies could render existing cybersecurity controls vulnerable. This includes current encryption systems that could be broken by future quantum computers.

Practical quantum computers, when they arrive, will force a change in how the internet is secured.

Where the strategy falls short

While the National Cybersecurity Strategy calls for continuing to expand information-sharing related to cybersecurity, it pledges to review federal classification policy to see where additional classified access to information is necessary.

The federal government already suffers from overclassification, so if anything, I believe less classification of cybersecurity information is needed to facilitate better information-sharing on this issue. It’s important to reduce administrative and operational obstacles to effective and timely interaction, especially where collaborative relationships are needed between industry, academia and federal and state governments. Excessive classification is one such challenge.

Further, the strategy does not address the use of cyber tactics, techniques and procedures in influence or disinformation campaigns and other actions that might target the U.S. This omission is perhaps intentional because, although cybersecurity and influence operations are often intertwined, reference to countering influence operations could lead to partisan conflicts over freedom of speech and political activity. Ideally, the National Cybersecurity Strategy should be apolitical.

That being said, the 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy is a balanced document. While in many ways it reiterates recommendations made since the first National Cybersecurity Strategy in 2002, it also provides some innovative ideas that could strengthen U.S. cybersecurity in meaningful ways and help modernize America’s technology industry, both now and into the future.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Written by Mona Tajali, Associate Professor of International Relations and Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, Agnes Scott College

It’s been six months since the latest spark ignited mass protests in Iran — the death of 22-year-old Kurdish-Iranian Mahsa (Jina) Amini in morality police custody after she was arrested for allegedly failing to wear her hijab properly.

The outrage over her killing resulted in women-led protests. Their slogan “woman, life, freedom,” originally a Kurdish manifesto, has helped fuel the Iranian protesters’ demands for radical change.




Read more:
Iranian women keep up the pressure for real change – but will broad public support continue?


The perseverance, bravery and determination of the Iranian protesters, particularly women and girls, have been heroic. Despite risks to their lives and freedoms due to a brutal government crackdown, many remain active in publicly articulating their grievances in a variety of ways.

In recent months, while some street presence has continued in Iran — for example, in response to the poisonings of schoolgirls in cities across the country — protesters are also organizing strikes, sit-ins, boycotts and publicizing their demands in the form of manifestos, charters and bills of rights.




Read more:
Iran: poisoning of thousands of schoolgirls piles more pressure on Islamic Republic struggling for survival


In fact, a key distinguishing factor between the recent protests and the previous ones is that Iranians have been forming coalitions to advocate for important structural and institutional changes in support of equality, human rights, democracy and freedom.

Demands for substantial change

Disillusioned with efforts to democratize and liberalize aspects of Iranian politics and society while working within the confines of the theocratic state, today’s protesters are demanding substantial political and social change that is markedly secular.

The woman, life, freedom protests are calling for basic rights and opportunities that have rarely been recognized throughout the 44-year rule of the Islamic Republic, even after landslide elections of reform-minded figures who promised reforms. In doing so, the protesters are challenging the core tenants of the theocratic regime.

The leaderless nature of the demonstrations, which some key protesters compare to other social justice movements like Black Lives Matter, has also fuelled democratic sentiments in Iran that have empowered ordinary Iranians to protest decades of unresponsive and unrepresentative government.

Protesters are now shifting to more concerted efforts involving charters or bills of rights that outline their specific demands — yet another indication that Iranians are politicized, organized and mobilized as they push for change.




Read more:
Iran: unions and civil rights groups demand democracy and social justice


Calls for a humane society

In mid-February, coinciding with the 44th anniversary of the formation of the Islamic Republic of Iran, several civil society groups — including labour unions, student organizations and women’s and human rights groups — collectively publicized a joint charter outlining their minimum demands for a “new, modern, and humane society.”

The charter focuses on the core demands of large sections of the Iranian population.

It advocates for a secular state in which “religion is a private matter … and should not interfere in the political, economic, social, and cultural destiny and laws of the country.”

The charter also includes demands for the release of all political prisoners, abolishing discriminatory laws against ethnic and religious minorities and ending environmental destruction.

Soon after the charter’s publication, many Iranian scholars, activists and notable opposition leaders outside of Iran expressed their support.




Read more:
Iran: unions and civil rights groups demand democracy and social justice


The rallying cry of “woman, life, freedom” has also inspired many women’s and human rights groups to capitalize on the gendered and ethnic aspects of the protests and highlight the interests of historically marginalized populations.

Solidarity among Iranian feminists

In February 2023, a group of feminists republished the Kurdish Women’s Charter that was originally drafted in 2004, but is still relevant given the ongoing systemic discrimination faced by ethnic Kurds in Iran.

One of the biggest successes of the protest movement has been the expressions of solidarity and collaboration among feminist groups, both inside and outside Iran.

After months of collaborative work, a collective of Iranian feminists announced their proposed Iran Women’s Bill of Rights on March 8, 2023 — International Women’s Day — outlining their key demands for gender equality, non-discrimination and social justice to be included in the future constitution of Iran.

Building on decades-long activism inside Iran, the mostly exiled group of Iranian feminists summarized some of these demands in 20 articles and invited feedback from the general Iranian public on each of them.

The document emphasizes the need for a bill of rights that addresses the historical and systemic discrimination women and other minority populations have long faced in Iran.

It also demands a secular form of government that prioritizes pluralism and egalitarianism, gender parity in political decision-making and immediate abolition of all discriminatory laws against women, ethnic and religious minorities and all other marginalized groups.

It outlines mechanisms for how to achieve each human right, building on feminist thought and the work of the global human rights movements. First, however, the living document will be presented to the Iranian public, initiating discussion and dialogue on its evolution and improvement.

In another historic move, the LGBTQ+ community in Iran also published its manifesto in early 2023, outlining its central demands.

This document in particular marked an important moment for Iran in that it publicly addressed assumed taboo topics such as recognition of non-binary gender identities and ways to concretely address systemic violence and discrimination against marginalized populations.

A woman in white with a beige headscarf and dark sunglasses flashes a victory sign as she walks along a a street.
A woman flashes a victory sign as she walks around in the old main bazaar of Tehran, Iran, in October 2022.
(AP Photo/Vahid Salemi)

To address the historical and systemic discrimination and injustice that has limited women’s and minorities’ rights, Iran’s protesters and feminists are actively preparing for substantial change.

These types of coalitions and solidarity among diverse populations are important steps towards the realization of fundamental human rights in the democratic, pluralist and just Iran of the future.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Written by Paul Rogers, Professor of Peace Studies, University of Bradford

Following political developments in the past fortnight, two state-level policy changes in the Middle East are likely to combine to have a substantial impact on regional stability.

On March 10, in a deal brokered by China and signed in Beijing, Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to reestablish diplomatic relations and reopen embassies after a seven-year break. While a long way from bringing an end to conflicts such as the bitter war in Yemen, it is, as Simon Mabon noted in an article for the Conversation, a positive development.

The previous week, writing in the Times, Middle East correspondent Michael Spencer revealed a plan by Gulf states to restore relations with the Assad regime in Syria.

If this report is accurate, the implications of the two developments for Middle East politics are substantial – not least because of recent social and political developments in Israel and Iran.

Arab detente

The essence of the Times story was that some Arab states want to normalise relations with Damascus – even if this is opposed by the US and its western allies. This should involve an easing of sanctions and more regional economic integration.

It will also mean getting Syria back into the Arab League, from which it has been suspended since 2012 following its brutal suppression of Arab Spring protesters. The move is championed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and along with the Saudi-Iran agreement has the potential to reorder the balance of power in the region.

The early indications are that beneficiaries of the two developments will include China and the individual regional autocracies involved. Beijing will benefit by taking a key role in facilitating the deal, thereby increasing its status across the Islamic Middle East and north Africa.

Russia is also likely to benefit, if less directly. It has carefully nurtured its military connections with Syria over the past decade, starting with its small naval facility at Tartus, which has the potential to give Russia a warm-water Mediterranean port. The port at Tartus is in the middle of a significant expansion that includes the construction of a new floating dock for ship repair.

Syrian president Bashar al-Assad with the Egyptian foreign minister, Sameh Shoukry wearing suits and ties. A aide watches from behind.
Friends again? Syrian president Bashar al-Assad with the Egyptian foreign minister, Sameh Shoukry in Damascus, February 2023.
Associated Press/Alamy Stock Photo

Russia has also long had the use of the Syrian Air Force’s Hmeimim airbase and has recently extended one of the runways. The base is now something of a military transport hub for links to Libya and states further south across the Sahel. Moscow also maintains close military connections with Iran, a relationship which is currently bearing fruit in the shape of a supply of armed drones for its war in Ukraine.

Nuclear deal

If both China and Russia benefit from the likely changes, what of the one other key state within the region, Israel? The long-term response of the Netanyahu government to the new circumstances will depend greatly on the status of the presently defunct Iranian nuclear deal.

A recent period of tension was eased by quick diplomacy by the head of the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Rafael Grossi, last month. There has been subsequent talk of a breakthrough on verification and monitoring activities. For the moment, the possibility of a crisis has lessened but not disappeared.

After years of gradual progress while Barack Obama was in the White House, the 15-year agreement was reached in July 2014 which would limit Iran’s nuclear ambitions in return for sanctions relief. The joint comprehensive plan of action (JCPOA) involved Iran, the US, China, France, Russia, Germany and the UK. The deal came into force in 2015.

It was disliked from the start by an Israeli government deeply suspicious of Iran. Israel’s concerns were subsequently partly assuaged by Donald Trump, who ditched the treaty and strengthened the sanctions regime in 2018. Since then, Iran has considered itself free of the limits but has eroded them round the edges rather than ditching them completely.

The current occupant of the White House, Joe Biden, has so far avoided strident condemnation of Iran’s actions. Not so for Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

But at present the Netanyahu government’s approach is also affected by the deep political and social unrest currently affecting Israel itself. This stems from a combination of a long-term division between the secular and the religious.

Secular Israelis tend to want the country’s judiciary to exercise a degree of power over the Knesset legislative body through the country’s supreme court – not least in matters of human rights.

Jewish religious parties, on the other hand, mostly want those powers subject to higher religious authority exercised through the Knesset. Netanyahu’s majority currently depends on the support of his ultra-religious coalition allies. And here lies the problem.

Israeli citizens demonstrating and holding up placards reading 'It's the democracy stupid'.
There have been mass protests in Israel about government plans to reform the judiciary.
Avivi Aharon via Shutterstock

While Netanyahu’s proposals to limit the power of the judiciary may be popular with his far-right parliamentary colleagues it has aroused fierce opposition, with hundreds of thousands of protesters taking to the streets. What makes them particularly significant is that they extend to the armed forces, with many of Israel’s most experienced air force pilots joining the protests.




Read more:
Israelis protest Netanyahu government’s brutality and plans to undermine rule of law


Traditionally, suspicions of Tehran are held across the political spectrum in Israel. This is rooted in Israel’s idea of itself as a bastion of western-style liberal democracy in a sea of Islamic autocracy. But now the evolving – and increasingly extreme – religious dimension in Israeli politics takes that to an even stronger level of concern over Iran’s real nuclear intentions.

Israel may have succeeded in strengthening economic links with some oil and gas-rich Gulf States, but it is far from convinced that the Iran/Saudi political thaw will have any effect on Iran’s nuclear intentions.

In that it is probably correct. Tehran has little confidence in the stability of the US’s approach to the JCPOA after what happened under Trump. So, while the developments of the last two weeks may be welcomed by many, on this issue at least, little has changed.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Written by Simon Mabon, Professor of International Relations, Lancaster University

After more than four decades as seemingly implacable enemies on either side of a deep political-religious divide in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and Iran have agreed to restore diplomatic relations and reopen embassies. The deal, which was signed in Beijing, comes seven years after diplomatic relations were severed in the aftermath of the execution in Saudi Arabia of Shia cleric Nimr Al Nimr and has been heralded as a “game-changing moment” for the Middle East.

While undeniably a positive move, the agreement will not end conflict in the region – with serious domestic issues continuing to drive conflict and violence in Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria. Yet serious economic challenges have prompted the Saudis and Iranians to engage in diplomatic talks over the past few years to create a more stable regional order, allowing their countries to engage in domestic reform programmes as a result.

The rivalry between Riyadh and Tehran has fractious roots, shaped by the interplay of security concerns, claims to leadership over the Muslim world, ethno-sectarian rivalries, and differing relationships with Washington. Lazy analysis has often reduced the rivalry to a sectarian conflict, a consequence of “ancient hatreds”. But such a reading of events is xenophobic and orientalist and ignores the context and contingencies shaping relations between the two states.

Despite the fractious roots, relations between the two states have oscillated between overt hostility and burgeoning detente since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, playing out in different ways across the Middle East.

Troubled region

The presence of shared religious, ethnic and ideological identities across the region has also prompted others to view conflict across the region through the lens of “proxy wars”. Various groups in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain and elsewhere have been seen as merely doing the bidding of paymasters in Riyadh or Tehran. This ignores the internal drivers of conflict and division, reducing analysis to a simplistic binary pitting Sunni against Shia.

Map of Middle East, 2023

The Middle East is riven with conflict, both political and sectarian. Reconciliation between Riyadh and Tehran is unlikely to fundamentally change that.
Library of Congress

Across the region, states where Saudi and Iranian interests have clashed, have also been beset by a range of their own complex socioeconomic and political challenges.

Since Saddam Hussein was deposed, Iraq has been characterised by a struggle among various factions to dominate the state. Shia parties, representing the country’s majority, have typically won elections, often with the support of Iran and much to the chagrin of Saudi Arabia. Yet to think of Iraqi politics purely as representing a proxy war between its two neighbours would be wrong. It ignores the domestic concerns of many and efforts to create a political landscape that works for Iraqis and is not just an arena for Riyadh and Tehran to increase their power.

In Yemen, while Saudi Arabia and Iran have both played a prominent role in the civil war, the key drivers of conflict are domestic, amid a broader struggle over territory, politics, visions of order, tribalism, resources and sectarian difference. The involvement of Riyadh and Tehran – in different ways – exacerbates these tensions. Fears about gains by Iran-backed Houthi rebels across Yemen prompted Saudi Arabia to embark on a devastating bombing campaign to curtail the group’s actions.

Houthi rebels march in Sana'a, Yemen.
Houthi forces put on a show of strength in Sana’a, Yemen, in January 20223 during a visit by US diplomats to Saudi Arabia to try to renew a truce which expired in October 2022.
EPA-EFE/Yahya Arhab

Tehran’s support for the Houthis – and the group’s attacks on the Saudi mainland – exacerbated the kingdom’s fears. Yet the war in Yemen is also a consequence of the fragmentation of the state and the emergence of several different groups vying for influence across a landscape beset by serious environmental challenges and food shortages.

In Lebanon, a devastating socioeconomic crisis plays out in the shell of the state, with sectarian groups providing support and protection to their constituencies in place of a functioning government. Key groups have received support from Saudi Arabia and Iran – most notably Hezbollah, which possesses strong ideological links with the Islamic Republic, and the Future Movement the party of government across most of the past decade, which has a complex relationship with Saudi Arabia.

Clearly the Saudis and Iranians have a keen interest in Lebanese politics. But in reality any conflict here is driven by competition between local groups seeking to impose their visions of order on a precarious political, social and economic landscape.

While there is little doubt that Saudi Arabia and Iran have the means to exert influence on politics across the region, local groups have their own agendas, aspirations and pressures. It remains to be seen how the reconciliation between Riyadh and Tehran will resonate in spaces beset by division.

There are undeniably positives for regional security. The reconciliation improves the possibility of a revived nuclear deal with Tehran – although it remains to be seen what Saudi Arabia has offered Iran to facilitate the agreement, and vice versa. Also, there are questions as to what monitoring and enforcement mechanisms have been put in place by China.

The role of China

Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of all of this concerns China’s role in proceedings. While diplomatic efforts aimed at improving relations between the two rivals have been taking place for several years, China’s ability to forge an agreement out of these talks points to Beijing’s growing influence in the region.

China has long had close economic ties with Iran, but in recent years Beijing has sought to increase its engagement with Arab states, notably Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Deteriorating relations between the two major Gulf powers would have had a negative impact on Chinese engagement and investment across the Middle East, both in terms of its infrastructure projects and the broader Belt and Road Initiative.

Although the US has publicly celebrated the initiative, privately there are several concerns about the broader implications for the Middle East and for global politics. This comes at a time when relations between Riyadh and Washington are tense.

US president Joe Biden bumps fists with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman in Riyadh, July 2022.
Tense: despite the fist-bump, relations between Washington and Riyadh remain difficult.
Saudi Press Agency/UPI Credit: UPI/Alamy Live News

This was perhaps best seen in the visit of the US president, Joe Biden, to Saudi Arabia after his vocal criticism of the kingdom’s human rights record and the publication of a report stating that Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman approved the operation to kill journalist Jamal Khashoggi, a US citizen. During the visit, Biden and bin Salman endured a tense meeting which largely failed to improve relations and highlighted the precarious nature of relations.

In such an environment, rising Chinese influence in the kingdom and across the Middle East is hardly surprising. China’s move into mediation offers some semblance of hope that an agreement can also be reached to end the war in Ukraine, but at what cost? The Chinese model of investment and the provision of “untied aid” – the provision of financial support without conditions – has long ignored concerns about democracy and human rights. So the agreement between the Saudis and the Iranians has been read by some as a victory for authoritarianism, further marginalising reform movements in both countries.

Much like the US, Israel is also concerned about the deal. For successive Israeli governments, Iran has long occupied the role of regional
bete noire, ultimately feeding into the signing of the Abraham Accords in the summer of 2020 which normalised relations between Israel, the UEA, Bahrain and Morocco as a strategic alliance against Tehran. The Netanyahu government has long sought to normalise relations with Saudi Arabia and hoped to use the Iranian threat as a means of achieving this goal.

Additionally, the deal raises questions about the future of regional security. The US has long been a mediator in regional disputes and has been viewed as a security guarantor by Israel, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. China’s actions here suggest that it is seeking to assert itself more keenly in the region’s politics. Reports suggest that Beijing is to host a meeting of Arab and Iranian leaders later in the year. If accurate, it positions China firmly as a – if not the – dominant actor across the Middle East.

A reconciliation between the Saudis and the Iranians is certainly good for regional order. But it will not address the causes of conflict in Yemen or elsewhere across the region. It also raises several serious issues around regional security and global order, the salience of democracy and human rights, and the future of US engagement with the Middle East.

While the initiative is a positive step, it is not a solution for the region’s conflicts. This Beijing-mediated agreement may in fact lead to further significant challenges for the people of the region.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Written by Afshin Shahi, Associate Professor (Senior Lecturer) in Middle East Politics & International Relations at Keele University, Keele University

The Iranian government has announced several arrests in connection with the reported poisoning of more than 7,000 schoolgirls in more than 100 schools around the country. Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, has condemned the poisonings, saying perpetrators should be “severely punished”.

Yet other government messages are confused. The education department announced that girls who had been taken to hospital were suffering from “mass hysteria” and the education minister insisted that 95% of the girls were merely suffering “fear and worry”.

The available evidence, including reports that pupils detected a strange smell in their classrooms, suggests a number of mass gas attacks in Iranian girls’ schools. Dismissing this reality as “hysteria” is a futile attempt to absolve the state of its culpability.

The act of dismissing the suffering inflicted on Iranian girls as mere “hysteria” comes after a prolonged period of violent suppression of Iranian protesters over the past six months. The widespread protests were sparked by the murder of Mahsa Amini, a young Kurdish-Iranian woman who was fatally beaten by the morality police in September 2022 for wearing her hijab improperly.

Since the protests began, thousands of protesters – many of them women and girls – have been arrested and by the end of January it was reported that 41 people had been sentenced to death for protesting. Hundreds of people have been killed in the streets and many Iranian girls have reportedly been raped by security forces while in custody.

Reports of poisoning in girls’ schools – which had been a major centre of protests – began to emerge in November last year from the city of Qom, home to the most senior clergy in Iran. Girls were reported to be displaying a range of symptoms including difficulty breathing, burning sensations, vomiting and paralysis of the lower extremities. Speaking to the UK’s Guardian newspaper recently, a local journalist said: “One doctor told me that based on the symptoms they’re seeing, it’s likely to be a weak organophosphate agent”. Organophosphates are toxic chemicals often used as pesticides in agriculture.

‘Women, life, freedom’

The immediate question is whether these alleged poisonings are connected with protests in girls’ schools after Amini’s death. Young women have been particularly visible in what has amounted to a nationwide uprising against the Islamic Republic, which has as its slogan: “Women, Life, Freedom”.

While the supreme leader called the poisonings “unforgiveable” and called for the death penalty for perpetrators, the head of Iran’s judiciary threatened to charge anyone who “spreads rumours and incitement” about the issue. Consequently, numerous critics contend that the supreme leader’s proclamation is merely an attempt to gloss over or conceal the truth.

Despite these poisonings going on for several months now, there remains a lack of clear information about the circumstances of the attacks and the chemicals used. The lack of media freedom in Iran hasn’t helped. But the fact that the attacks have occurred throughout the country would suggest that whoever is behind them has access to a significant quantity of these chemicals and has the organisation to orchestrate such a large number of attacks across the country.

That’s why there has been increasing suspicion that either an extreme faction within the state is responsible, or that a state with 16 parallel security organisations to monitor every facet of life should be able to identify the masterminds behind these nationwide attacks.

Comparisons have been made with the shooting down by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of Ukrainian airliner, Flight 737, in January 2020. Regime officials categorically denied responsibility for a week until emerging evidence compelled them to accept accountability.

On the brink?

Once the poisonings – and the treatment of parents who complained and were savagely beaten by regime security officials – went viral on social media and were picked up by international news outlets, the blame game began to unfold rapidly.

An elderly man in Islamic clerical clothes with Iranian schoolgirls in traditional costume.
Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khomenei, sits with Iranian schoolgirls at the ‘Festival of Angels’, held when young women reach the ‘age of obligation’,or puberty.
Balkis Press/ABACAPRESS.COM

The president, Ebrahim Raisi, attributed the attacks to “foreign enemies” – a fairly typical response in Iran. The regime heavily relies on the abstract notion of a foreign enemy – usually America – to absolve itself of any responsibility. In this case Raisi was not specific about which country was behind the alleged poison attacks.

But the issue is further feeding unrest in a country which remains on a knife-edge. Hundreds of thousands continue to protest against the state for political repression, corruption, and discrimination against women and ethnic minorities.

The problem faced by the Islamic Republic is that there is massive support for the protests. A leaked government poll from November 2022 found that 84% of Iranians expressed a positive view of the uprising and trust in the government and its media outlets has fallen sharply in recent years. More than 60% of respondents in an online survey said they wanted to transition away from the Islamic Republic.

Several observers have noted similarities to acid attacks carried out in 2014 when assailants on motorcycles threw acid in the faces of at least eight women who were driving with their windows down. One woman died, and the remaining victims sustained permanent physical impairment.

Following the acid attacks, thousands of people demonstrated in the city of Isfahan to express their horror and outrage. Many Iranians believe that the victims were targeted because they wore clothing considered by hardliners as “inappropriate”. So the arrest and murder of Amini for not wearing her hijab in the approved manner has resonated in the minds of many ordinary Iranians.

Nobody was held accountable for the 2014 acid attacks. But things are different now. Back then, the state did not face the same crisis of legitimacy as it does currently. Now, a protest that began in defence of women’s rights, secularism and democracy has spread across almost all of Iranian society encompassing men and women young and old, urban and rural, workers and intellectuals. Although the Islamic Republic is accustomed to internal and external upheavals, it is currently facing an existential crisis.

By attacking girls in their schools the only possible motive must be to perpetuate a climate of fear in Iran. Perhaps fear is the last weapon in the arsenal of a regime that appears to be struggling for survival.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Written by Simin Fadaee, Senior Lecturer in Sociology, University of Manchester

Forty-four years after Iranians rose up against their hated monarch in February 1979, a group of 20 organisations engaged in long-term social and economic struggles – including labour unions, teachers, women’s groups and youth and student movements – issued an ultimatum to the government of the Islamic Republic.

The Charter of Minimum Demands of Independent Trade Union and Civil Organisations of Iran contains 12 demands concerning social justice, democracy and political reform. The charter is a protest:

against misogyny and gender-based discrimination, economic instability, the modern enslavement of the workforce, poverty, distress, class violence, and nationalist, centralist, and religious oppression. It is a revolution against any form of tyranny, whether it be under the pretext of religion or not; any form of tyranny that has been inflicted upon us, the majority of the people of Iran.

This charter represents the first organised and collective demand from within Iran since the explosion of unrest on Iranian streets after the death of Mahsa Amini at the hands of the morality police in September 2022.

The push for transformation inside Iran stands in stark contrast to the attempts of some exiled Iranians who want to reimpose the pre-1979 monarchy.

The revolutionary movement that overthrew Mohammad Reza Shah, the last monarch of Iran, was a broad-based coalition of mostly urban working- and middle-class people. Supporters of the revolution were united by their opposition to the monarchy, but they were motivated by a range of ideologies: socialism, communism, liberalism, secularism, Islamism and nationalism.

These groups were also unified by their fierce opposition to Iran’s foreign policy that left it subordinate to the west. Deeply etched in Iranians’ collective memory is the fact that the monarchy had been reinstalled in 1953 after a coup d’etat against the democratically elected president, Mohammad Mosaddegh. The coup had been orchestrated by the US and UK, who backed Mohammad Reza Shah throughout his brutal and oppressive reign, in return for control of Iran’s oil industry.

By the 1970s, brutal state oppression was accompanied by increasing inequality. Poor living and working conditions provoked unrest that was met with further repression and Iran’s jails overflowed with political prisoners.

In January 1979, Mohammad Reza Shah and his family were forced into exile by a broad-based revolutionary coalition. But the unity that succeeded in ousting the hated regime proved to be shortlived and the theocratic Islamic Republic was established under the leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

But a large segment of Iranian society that had supported the revolution staunchly opposed the Islamic Republic from the beginning. This opposition has remained firm to the present day and is represented in huge numbers in the street protests that have rocked Iran since the death of Amini.

Amini, a Kurdish Iranian, was visiting relatives in Tehran when she was arrested by the morality police for violating the Islamic Republic’s strict dress code. Her death, after reportedly being brutally beaten while in custody, provoked outrage across the country.




Read more:
Iran: hijab protests reflect society-wide anger at regime which trashes rule of law and human rights


In the protests that followed, many young women and men have been killed by security forces. Now the Islamic Republic faces the most serious challenge in its 44-year existence.

Iran 1979. Women protesters wearing hijabs and holding up a placard of the Ayatollah Khomeini.
Women were at the forefront of the 1979 revolution which overthrew the monarchy. Now they are leading the protest movement against the oppressive patriarchy of the Islamic Republic.
Wikimedia Commons

During the 1979 revolution, the hijab became a symbol of resistance to the Pahlavi monarchy and its commitment to “modernise” – in other words, westernise – Iranian society. Many women wore the headscarf as a protest against the imposition of western norms.

After the Islamic Republic took power the dress code for women became stricter. A month after the revolution – on March 8 1979, women launched massive demonstrations across Iran against what they saw as patriarchal oppression on the part of the new Islamic regime. However, the hijab became obligatory in 1983, by which time Iran was at war with Iraq.

So the hijab symbolises Iranian women’s struggle against control by both the monarchy and the theocracy. The killing of Amini in September 2022 was the trigger for the current wave of protests, but they are a manifestation of long-lasting repressive gender relations. It is opposition to deeply rooted patriarchal relations that brought women and girls onto the streets in their hundreds of thousands across almost every city and town.

While women led the demonstrations, many men offered support. The slogan “Woman, Life, Freedom”, which places women at the centre of the struggle, also calls for transformative changes in the economy (“life”) and politics (“freedom”). Like in 1979, the current protests enjoy support from diverse social groups. For many, this wave of demonstrations represents continuity with the 1979 revolution, and an opportunity to achieve the objectives that were undermined by the establishment of the Islamic Republic.

Progressive revolution

The 44th anniversary of the 1979 revolution marked a significant moment for which many Iranians have been longing. The new charter calls for “an end to the formation of any kind of power from above and to start a social, progressive, and human revolution for the liberation of peoples from any form of tyranny, discrimination, colonisation, oppression, and dictatorship”.

The demands are broad-ranging. They include the freedom of all political prisoners, freedom of belief and expression, equality between men and women and improved wages and conditions for all workers. They demand the free participation of people in democracy through local and national councils and the redistribution of wealth and resources.

The charter provides the first draft of a vision for a new Iran. Its proclamation on the anniversary of the 1979 revolution makes a historical connection to that struggle and its anti-imperialist and anti-dictatorial sentiments. The demands put forward demonstrate that Iranians have a clear vision for their future. And it shows that it is time for the reactionary forces outside Iran to accept that Iranian people can indeed alter their society from within.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Written by Shireen Daft, Lecturer, Macquarie Law School, Macquarie University

Recent media attention has drawn global focus on an escalating number of Iranian schoolgirls falling ill over the past few months because of suspected chemical attacks. Accounts differ, but many reports cite more than 1,000 cases of poisoning at schools across Iran. At least 58 schools in ten provinces across the country have been affected.

The first known cases were reported in the city of Qom in November. There has been an escalation of reported cases, with 26 schools affected in a wave of attacks last week. The students have reported respiratory problems, nausea, dizziness and fatigue, with several girls hospitalised. Parents have been keeping their daughters home from school to protect them from these attacks.

Escalating public unrest and international attention has led Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to publicly denounce the attacks as a “major and unforgivable crime”, promising an investigation and swift punishment for those responsible.

This follows months of contradictory statements from government officials, the arrest of a journalist investigating the issue earlier this week, and the reported use of tear gas to disperse an organised demonstration about the poisonings in Tehran on Sunday.

Many consider the attacks a direct response to the ongoing protests in Iran since the death of Mahsa Amini in September. Students, mostly university students but also schoolgirls, have been at the forefront of those protests.

To date, there has been no direct evidence about who is responsible for the poisonings, and continued uncertainty about how they are carried out. Part of the difficulty in collecting information is the extreme limits imposed on press freedom in Iran. There have been calls from the international community for the United Nations to conduct an independent investigation.




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There are some who question whether there have been any chemical attacks at all. Instead, they speculate that this is in fact evidence of a mass psychogenic illness.

This would not be unprecedented – in an investigation of alleged poisonings of schoolgirls in Afghanistan between 2012-16, the UN concluded it was most likely a result of mass psychogenic illness, after finding no trace of chemical gas or poison.

However, the reality is that poisonous substances can degrade rapidly, especially nitrogen dioxide, which one government probe in Iran has indicated may be the cause. There have also been unconfirmed witness reports of suspicious objects being thrown into schoolyards.

Global threats to girls’ education

Another reason that the deliberate poisonings of the Iranian schoolgirls is so credible is that it is far from unusual. While education, including girls’ education, is highly respected in Iran, schoolgirls globally are all too often the object of attacks.

A report conducted by the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack looked at attacks on girls’ education between 2014 and 2018 in regions of conflict and instability. It found that schoolgirls and female teachers have been directly targeted in at least 18 countries, including Afghanistan, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, India, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen.

The nature of attacks is wide and varied, including the bombing of girls’ schools and abduction of girls. Teachers and students have been attacked either en route to school or while there. There have also been reports of sexual violence and sometimes forced marriage of both girls and their female teachers.

One of the most infamous cases of violence directed at girls for “daring” to attend school remains Malala Yousafzai being shot in the head in 2012 in Pakistan. There are also less direct forms of attacks, including the repurposing and shutting down of girls’ schools as a lower priority than boys’ education, threats to keep girls away from school, and the imposition and violent enforcement of restrictive dress codes.

One of the most infamous attacks against a girl simply for attending school was against Malala Yousafzai in 2012.
Nelson Antoine/AP/AAP

Attacks on schools have escalated sharply in recent decades, but this escalation has been particularly acute in relation to schools dedicated to girls. All too often, these attacks occur with impunity.

The impact of attacks on education for girls

Even if the effects of the poisonings on the Iranian schoolgirls have so far not shown any evidence of serious impacts on their health, there are still long-term psychological effects of being the target of a systematic and gendered attack, and unknown long-term physical consequences.

Aside from the direct impact on the right of everyone to an education for the “full development of the human personality and […] dignity”, attacks on education have a profound and lasting effect on girls.

Girls deprived of an education are more likely to be vulnerable to child or forced marriages, usually also resulting in reduced reproductive and sexual autonomy. There is also increased risk of domestic violence and a life of poverty. Attacks on schools have also been linked to an increased likelihood of girls being forced into recruitment to armed groups and becoming victims of human and sexual trafficking.

More generally, the violation of the right to education, and systemic gender discrimination results in girls and women having fewer opportunities to participate meaningfully in political, cultural, and social life. This loss affects not just individual girls and women, but society generally.




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There is no quick fix

Unfortunately, there is no simple fix to such attacks on girls’ education. While the investigation and prosecution of those responsible in Iran is an important step for accountability, it does not address the underlying problems.

Girls’ education under attack is always going to be part of broader contexts of systemic and widespread discrimination against women, and systems of oppression that reinforce stereotypical attitudes towards girls and women.

But protecting the right of girls to an education should be the cornerstone of any efforts towards gender equality. Such blatant and horrific attacks on girls in schools, as in Iran, should act as a clarion call for urgent change.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Iran has been rocked by a series of poison attacks on schoolgirls, causing hundreds of students to fall ill. The motives behind these attacks remain unclear, but there are speculations that they may be in retaliation for the recent protests against mandatory hijab laws in the country.

The attacks on female students have been described as an act of “biological terrorism,” sparking widespread concern and condemnation. It has once again highlighted the persistent danger that women and girls face in Iran, where there have been numerous reports of acid attacks and other forms of violence against women.

The Iranian government says it has launched an investigation into the incidents and has taken steps to improve security measures in schools to prevent future attacks. However, many human rights activists and organizations are calling for more action and accountability from the government, urging them to address the root causes of gender-based violence and discrimination in the country.

The incidents have drawn international attention and condemnation, with many expressing concern and outrage over the safety and well-being of women and girls in Iran. The United Nations has called on the Iranian government to take immediate action to protect the rights and safety of women and girls and to hold perpetrators accountable for their actions.

Background

Gen Z

Gen Z in Iran, like their counterparts in other countries, are individuals born between the mid-1990s and the mid-2010s. They have grown up in a rapidly changing environment, influenced by advances in technology and global events.

Despite the challenges they face in Iran, including restrictions on freedom of expression and access to information, Gen Z is a highly tech-savvy and digitally connected generation. Social media platforms like Instagram, Telegram, and WhatsApp are extremely popular among Gen Z in Iran, providing a space for them to connect with others, express themselves, and engage in political and social issues.

Gen Z in Iran is characterized by a strong sense of social and environmental consciousness, with many advocating for social justice and climate action. They are also highly diverse, with many coming from different cultural, ethnic, and religious backgrounds.

While Gen Z in Iran faces many challenges and limitations due to the country’s political and social context, they are also a resilient and adaptable generation. They continue to find ways to connect and express themselves, using technology and social media to share their experiences and perspectives with the world.

Gen Z in Iran has grown up in an environment where ideological narratives have dominated the political discourse for decades. However, with the advent of new technologies and the rise of social media, they have increasingly turned towards post-ideological discourses with a focus on environmental, social, and governance issues. The loss of Pirouz, a critically endangered cheetah cub in Iran, is an example of how Gen Z in Iran is increasingly focused on environmental issues.

One of the key factors driving this shift is the growing awareness of environmental issues in Iran. The country faces a range of environmental challenges, from air and water pollution to deforestation and desertification. Gen Z in Iran has been at the forefront of raising awareness about these issues and advocating for change. They are often referred to as the “Green Generation,” reflecting their commitment to environmentalism.

In addition to environmental issues, Gen Z in Iran is also focused on social and governance issues. They are more likely to prioritize issues such as social justice, gender equality, and political change. They are critical of the government’s policies and often use social media to express their dissatisfaction with the status quo.

Another factor driving the shift towards post-ideological discourses is the influence of global trends and values. Gen Z in Iran is increasingly exposed to global issues and debates through social media and other digital platforms. This exposure has helped them to develop a more nuanced and critical perspective on politics, society, and culture.

Frontline

The recent protests in Iran against mandatory hijab laws are an example of how Gen Z in Iran is focused on social justice and gender equality issues. The protests began after the death of Jina-Mahsa Amini, a young Kurdish-Iranian woman who died in the custody of the morality police. The protests have spread across the country, with demonstrations taking place in almost all of Iran’s 31 provinces and involving people from various backgrounds, including many young women.

One of the notable aspects of these protests is the role of social media in empowering young women to challenge the country’s patriarchal laws. Gen Z in Iran is using social media platforms like Twitter and Instagram to share their experiences and amplify their voices, often using the hashtag #IranRevolution and #MahsaAmini to document their protests and express their dissent.

These protests are part of a long history of women’s rights movements in Iran, but what makes them different is the way in which young women are using social media to elevate their own agency and challenge the status quo. They are calling for an end to mandatory hijab laws and other forms of gender-based discrimination and demanding greater social justice and political change.

The Iranian government’s response to the protests, including the uncertainty over the disbanding of the morality police, highlights the ongoing tension between the government and Gen Z in Iran. Young Iranians are critical of the government’s policies and often use social media to express their dissatisfaction with the status quo. They are advocating for greater freedom, equality, and accountability from their leaders, reflecting their desire for a more open, tolerant, and progressive society.

Enjoining Good and Forbidding Wrong

In Islamic culture, the concept of “enjoining good and forbidding wrong” is considered a noble act and a religious duty for Muslims. It is seen as a means of promoting righteousness and preventing evil in society.

However, the Islamic Regime in Iran has often used this concept to extend its theocratic rules and views, enforcing certain moral codes and social norms on the population. The regime has been criticized for using “enjoining good and forbidding wrong” to justify oppressive and discriminatory policies, particularly against women and minority groups.

For example, the enforcement of compulsory hijab laws, restrictions on music and entertainment, and the prohibition of social and political activities and other forms of “immoral” behaviour are all justified by the regime as examples of “enjoining good and forbidding wrong.” This has led to controversy and opposition from many Iranians who see it as an infringement on personal freedoms and an attempt to impose religious values on society.

Despite the controversy, many religious and conservative Iranians continue to view “enjoining good and forbidding wrong” as a necessary means of preserving Islamic values and preventing immoral behaviour. However, there is a growing movement of Iranians who seek to balance religious values with personal freedoms and political reform, challenging the regime’s strict interpretation of the concept.

Iran has long been known for its strict dress code laws for women, which are enforced by the morality police. Since its establishment in 1979 in Iran, there have been reports of organized violent attacks on women who do not fully comply with the dress code, particularly with the mandatory hijab laws. However, the issue came to a head in 2014, when a series of acid attacks were carried out in the city of Isfahan, targeting women who were not fully covered in hijab.

Ayatollah Yousef Tabatabai-Nejad, the Friday prayer imam of the central Iranian city of Isfahan, recently called for the public shaming and punishment of women who violate the country’s mandatory dress code known as hijab. His remarks have sparked fears of a new wave of violent attacks against women who do not fully adhere to Islamic dress codes.

Four men were eventually arrested in connection with the attacks, but the Iranian government faced criticism for its handling of the case. Many accused the government of not doing enough to protect women and prevent such attacks from happening in the future.

Using the concept of “enjoining good and forbidding wrong” to enforce conservative social norms is a major concern, as it puts the safety and well-being of Iranian women at risk.

Moreover, the regime’s use of violence to enforce its version of Islamic law has created a culture of impunity, where perpetrators of violence against women are rarely held accountable for their actions. This has led to a climate of fear for women in Iran, who are often afraid to speak out or report such incidents for fear of retaliation.

Fire at Will

The concept of “fire at will” was used by Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, in a speech on June 7th, 2017. The statement was widely interpreted as a criticism of President Hassan Rouhani’s centrist government, and it sparked extensive controversy and debate in the country.

Khamenei’s remarks called for “commanders of the soft war” to act in a “fire at will” manner when key think tanks and cultural and political institutions fall into disarray and stagnation. However, in his “Eid al-Fitr” sermon celebrating the end of Ramadan, Khamenei tried to tone down his earlier remarks, clarifying that “fire at will” does not call for anarchy or the violation of civil rights.

Despite Khamenei’s attempt to defuse the situation, several lawyers warned that using the military term can easily lead to breaking the law and the violation of civil rights. Nobel Peace Prize laureate Shirin Ebadi stated that “Khamenei’s call for the fire at will is [practically] shooting at the law.”

However, several media and military institutions under Khamenei’s direct supervision tried to defuse his controversial remarks, arguing that “fire at will” means encouraging people for cultural activities and calling for spontaneous and upstanding cultural work.

Despite Khamenei’s later softening of tone, his followers within the Basij Militia, the Islamic Revolution Guards’ Corps, and security organizations tend to follow his first remarks as a directive.

Khamenei’s call for “fire at will” has been interpreted by some as a signal to hardline groups to step up their efforts to enforce these moral codes through violent means. The phrase has been associated with the Basij Militia, which has been responsible for violent attacks on protesters and other perceived enemies of the state.

Critics have warned that Khamenei’s comments could lead to an increase in violence and repression in Iran, particularly against women and other marginalized groups. The international community has called on Iran to respect human rights and uphold the principles of democracy and freedom of expression.

While the Islamic Republic of Iran claims to uphold Islamic values, its actions often contradict the principles of compassion, tolerance, and respect for human dignity that are at the core of Islamic teachings.

Written by Amin Saikal, Adjunct professor, The University of Western Australia

The Iranian Islamic regime has been seriously challenged since the start of public protests last September. The government has sought to contain and suppress the protesters – even resorting to executions – but has been unable to stop them.

There are continuing reports of mass demonstrations in various parts of the country, including in the capital Tehran and other major cities in recent weeks.

The European Union last week placed new sanctions on Iranian individuals and entities, but stopped short of labelling the Revolutionary Guards a terrorist group. Australia has also imposed new sanctions on Iranian officials, but critics have said it is not sufficient.




Read more:
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Regime endures despite decades of protests

This is not the first time the Islamic regime has been besieged by protests. It has faced many domestic and foreign policy challenges over the past 40 years, including severe Western sanctions and international isolation.

The regime came to power in the wake of the momentous revolution of 1978-79 that toppled the pro-Western monarchy of Mohammad Reza Shah. This propelled his key religious and political opponent, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, to transform Iran into a radical, predominantly Shia Islamic republic, with an anti-US posture.

Mohammad Reza Shah and Empress Farah at Tehran’s airport, preparing to leave Iran in 1979.
AP

Since then, Iran has been marked by growing domestic discontent over the regime’s conservative religious laws, political oppression, corruption and economic woes. The US has also frequently criticised the regime for human rights violations, its alleged frequent meddling in its neighbours’ affairs, and its controversial nuclear program.

Yet, the regime has managed to stay in power with a mix of force to contain internal opposition and ideological and pragmatic resilience to rebuff outside pressure.

In the process, the state has endured, but the society has suffered from religious restrictions, poor governance, economic decline, social and cultural stagnation and endemic corruption, despite Iran being an oil- and gas-rich country.

Iran’s currency has dropped to its lowest value this month due to sanctions imposed by Western countries.
Abedin Taherkenareh/EPA

A new crisis for the regime

The current wave of protests – the largest and longest in the Islamic Republic’s history – was sparked by the death of a young Kurdish woman Mahsa Amini while in the custody of the regime’s notorious morality police. She had been arrested for for not wearing her hijab properly last September.

This tragic episode drove large masses of Iranian women, most from the post-revolutionary generation, to take to the streets for the first time. Their slogan became ubiquitous: “women, life, freedom”.

Given the widespread public grievances over other issues, the ranks of the protesters rapidly snowballed, signalling a revolutionary direction.

Shocked by the scale of the protests, the regime has used brute force to suppress them. So far, more than 500 demonstrators have been killed, many more injured and tens of thousands detained. At least four protesters have been hanged on charges of “war against God” or “corruption on earth”.

Do sanctions matter?

Most of the authoritarian governments in the region, plus Russia and China, have remained mute on the regime’s crackdown. But the West and human rights organisations have been outraged.

The US, UK and EU have condemned the regime’s repressive actions at home and supply of arms to Russia in support of its aggression in Ukraine. They have imposed multiple rounds of sanctions on the regime, including last week.

Members of the Iranian diaspora, including those in Australia, have also urged democracies around the world to put greater pressure on the regime.

A solidarity with Iran rally in Sydney in November.
Paul Braven

In line with the US and its other allies, the Australian government also announced new Magnitsky-style sanctions on the regime in early February, targeting 16 law enforcement, political and military officials, including those with the powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.




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This came after criticism the government has been too slow and “risk-averse” to act.

An Australian Senate inquiry has also recommended designating the Revolutionary Guards a terrorist organisation – a move taken by the US and Canada.

But the Australian government has not so far acted on the Senate inquiry’s recommendation, probably because it wants to keep lines of diplomatic communication open. The UK has also resisted for similar reasons.

The reality, though, is that sanctions are unlikely to have any more impact on the regime than what it has experienced during most of its existence. No outside measure is likely to deter the governing clerical elite from ensuring its survival.

The Basij paramilitary forces and other individuals targeted by Canberra hardly have any assets in Australia. Furthermore, the volume of trade between the two countries has dwindled over the years, amounting to just A$205 million in 2020-21.

However, sanctions do have symbolic value. Canberra could also go a step further by severing diplomatic ties, though this will not be in the interest of keeping the lines of communications open.

What could come next?

As of late, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has reportedly pardoned many of the detained protesters. This amnesty, however, doesn’t apply to everyone and comes with conditions.

Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, speaking at a ceremony earlier in February.
Iranian Supreme Leader Office/ EPA

But this may not mark the end of the story. The regime is well-entrenched and possesses all the necessary means to get even tougher. Many of those who created it still run it. Their fortunes are intimately tied to the survival of the theocratic order.

The protesters have also shown a remarkable determination to continue their actions in one way or another. The scene is set for more troubled times ahead.




Read more:
How female Iranian activists use powerful images to protest oppressive policies


This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Written by Ali Asgary, Professor, Disaster & Emergency Management, Faculty of Liberal Arts & Professional Studies & Director, CIFAL York, York University, Canada

The strong and disastrous earthquake that shook southern Turkey and Syria on Feb. 6 drew attention to search-and-rescue (SAR) operations. The media’s attention raised familiar questions around SAR, including who conducts SAR, what formal and informal SAR teams are available, and how long trapped people are able to survive before being rescued.

Over the past 50 years, many studies have been conducted to address these questions.

I have been researching and examining earthquakes, building codes, urban planning and emergency operations since 1990, after experiencing the Manjil-Roudbar earthquake in Iran. Just after midnight on June 21, I was woken up by the magnitude 7.6 earthquake. More than 40,000 people lost their lives and over 300,000 were injured.

The last option for saving lives

Referring to an earthquake as a “killer earthquake” ignores the harsh reality that the buildings killed people. Until having an effective earthquake early warning, we need to rely on building codes and urban and physical planning. However, most cities and villages in earthquake-prone areas either do not have or are unable to fully implement seismic codes to prevent construction in high hazard zones and enforce building codes.

If a strong earthquake occurs in a region where buildings aren’t constructed to withstand the impact, the only hope for people trapped would be timely, effective and equipped SAR operations.

Search-and-rescue is the last option when it comes to saving lives after a disaster. Most SAR efforts are carried out by local people and SAR teams.

Urbanization and earthquakes

Rapid urbanization, vertical development and heavy building materials, make it very difficult for untrained and unequipped survivors to locate and extract trapped people from complex and hazardous piles of debris. The need for trained and equipped SAR teams in urban areas has long been established.

an aerial photo showing a devastated urban area

A drone photo showing the massive devastation in Aleppo, Syria, caused by the Feb. 6 earthquake in Syria and Turkey.
(Shutterstock)

Many countries have created urban search-and-rescue teams, like Canada’s Heavy Urban Search and Rescue Teams or Task Forces.

There is a clear positive correlation between the number of buildings collapsed and the number of people killed in the earthquakes. In strong earthquakes (measuring more than seven on the moment magnitude scale) in high-density urban areas, up to 70 per cent of the collapsed buildings’ occupants become trapped under debris.

After the earthquake, SAR operations race against time because the chances of survival for people trapped under the collapsed buildings fades away rapidly.

Fade-away time — the length of time between the disaster event and a trapped individual’s chances for survival reaching zero varies depending on multiple factors including age, level of injury, weather conditions and the situation of the victim. For example, for a person with major blood loss, the average maximum chance for survival is almost two days, compared with an average maximum of 6.8 days for someone who is uninjured.

Complicated rescues

Rescuing individuals from high-rise multistory buildings is much more complicated and as such, the role of heavy SAR teams becomes critical. In low-density urban or rural areas, the majority of trapped individuals can be rescued within two days without using sophisticated tools, however, this is not the case in multistory buildings.

The 1995 Mexico City earthquake, the 1995 Kobe earthquake and the 2010 Haiti earthquake are prime examples of such complex situations and search and rescue operations.

SAR operations become much more complex if earthquakes occur overnight, because the occupancy rates of the buildings are usually at their highest level and more people are inside the collapsed buildings, such as the timing of the recent earthquakes in Turkey and Syria.

Relying on international SAR teams for the critical hours of search and rescue is not very realistic. Despite the creation of coordinated bodies such as the United Nations International SAR Advisory Group, these teams arrive at the impacted areas too late.

During the 2010 Haiti and 2015 Nepal earthquakes, about 53 international teams arrived in these countries — most arrived after three days. In Haiti, 132 people were rescued by the 52 international SAR teams with 1,820 personnel.

a rescue worker with a white helmet and a French emblem hunches down in debris

A search-and-rescue worker looks through debris in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, on Jan. 21, 2010.
THE CANADIAN PRESS/Adrian Wyld

Investing in search-and-rescue capacity

Putting all these past experiences, evidence and realities together, the bottom line is that earthquake-prone countries — including Canada — need to build capacity and invest in local and national SAR teams to be able to conduct effective and timely search and rescue during the first two days after the event.

Nonetheless, this must be established in conjunction with ensuring new buildings are constructed according to codes and existing buildings are retrofitted as much as possible to minimize the impact of earthquakes.

These are long-term and continued investments that would save many lives in the rare instances of their deployment. The challenge lies in that such long-term investments are not very attractive to those in decision-making positions. Long-term emergency plans require funding, capacity building and investment in search-and-rescue resources.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Written by Ahmet T. Kuru, Professor of Political Science, San Diego State University

On Jan. 17, 2023, Pakistan’s National Assembly unanimously voted to expand the country’s laws on blasphemy, which carries the death penalty for insulting the Prophet Muhammad. The new law now extends the punishment to those deemed to have insulted the prophet’s companions, which could include thousands of early Muslims, with 10 years in prison or life imprisonment.

Human rights activists are concerned that the expanded laws could target minorities, particularly Shiite Muslims who are critical of many leading early Muslims.

Pakistan has the world’s second-strictest blasphemy laws after Iran. About 1,500 Pakistanis have been charged with blasphemy over the past three decades. In a case covered by the international media, Junaid Hafeez, a university lecturer, was sentenced to death on the charge of insulting the prophet on Facebook in 2019. His sentence has been under appeal.

Although no executions have ever taken place, extrajudicial killings related to blasphemy have occurred in Pakistan. Since 1990, more than 70 people have been murdered by mobs and vigilantes over allegations of insulting Islam.

My research shows that blasphemy laws historically emerged to serve the political and religious authorities, and they continue to have a role in silencing dissent in many Muslim countries.

Blasphemy and apostasy

Of the 71 countries that criminalize blasphemy, 32 are majority Muslim. Punishment and enforcement of these laws vary.

Blasphemy is punishable by death in Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Brunei, Mauritania and Saudi Arabia. Among non-Muslim-majority countries, the harshest blasphemy laws are in Italy, where the maximum penalty is two years in prison.

Half of the world’s 49 Muslim-majority countries have additional laws banning apostasy, meaning people may be punished for leaving Islam. All countries with apostasy laws are Muslim-majority. Apostasy is often charged along with blasphemy.

Laws on apostasy are quite popular in some Muslim countries. According to a 2013 Pew survey, about 75% of respondents in Muslim-majority countries in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia favor making sharia, or Islamic law, the official law of the land. Among those who support sharia, around 25% in Southeast Asia, 50% in the Middle East and North Africa and 75% in South Asia say they support “executing those who leave Islam” – that is, they support laws punishing apostasy with death.

Two firefighters stand in puddles in a burned-out between .
Firefighters in a factory torched by an angry mob in Jhelum, Pakistan, after one of the factory’s employees was accused of desecrating the Quran, Nov. 21, 2015.
STR/AFP via Getty Images

The ulema and the state

My 2019 book “Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment” traces the roots of blasphemy and apostasy laws in the Muslim world back to a historic alliance between Islamic scholars and government.

Starting around the year 1050, certain Sunni scholars of law and theology, called the “ulema,” began working closely with political rulers to challenge what they considered to be the sacrilegious influence of Muslim philosophers on society.

Muslim philosophers had for three centuries been making major contributions to mathematics, physics and medicine. They developed the Arabic number system used across the West today and invented a forerunner of the modern camera.

The conservative ulema felt that these philosophers were inappropriately influenced by Greek philosophy and Shiite Islam against Sunni beliefs. The most prominent name in consolidating Sunni orthodoxy was the respected Islamic scholar Ghazali, who died in the year 1111.

In several influential books still widely read today, Ghazali declared two long-dead leading Muslim philosophers, Farabi and Ibn Sina, as apostates for their unorthodox views on God’s power and the nature of resurrection. Their followers, Ghazali wrote, could be punished with death.

As modern-day historians Omid Safi and Frank Griffel assert, Ghazali’s declaration provided justification to Muslim sultans from the 12th century onward who wished to persecute – even executethinkers seen as threats to conservative religious rule.

This “ulema-state alliance,” as I call it, began in the mid-11th century in Central Asia, Iran and Iraq and a century later spread to Syria, Egypt and North Africa. In these regimes, questioning religious orthodoxy and political authority wasn’t merely dissent – it was apostasy.

Wrong direction

Parts of Western Europe were ruled by a similar alliance between the Catholic Church and monarchs. These governments assaulted free thinking, too. During the Spanish Inquisition, between the 16th and 18th centuries, thousands of people were tortured and killed for apostasy.

Blasphemy laws were also in place, if infrequently used, in various European countries until recently. Denmark, Ireland and Malta all recently repealed their blasphemy laws. But they persist in many parts of the Muslim world.

In Pakistan, the military dictator Zia-ul-Haq, who ruled the country from 1978 to 1988, is responsible for its harsh blasphemy laws. An ally of the ulema, Zia updated blasphemy laws – written by British colonizers to avoid interreligious conflict – to defend specifically Sunni Islam and increased the maximum punishment to death.

From the 1920s until Zia, these laws had been applied only about a dozen times. Since then, they have become a powerful tool for crushing dissent.

Some dozen Muslim countries, including Iran and Egypt, have undergone a similar process over the past four decades.

Dissenting voices in Islam

The conservative ulema base their case for blasphemy and apostasy laws on a few reported sayings of the prophet, known as hadith, primarily: “Whoever changes his religion, kill him.”

But many Islamic scholars and Muslim intellectuals reject this view as radical. They argue that Prophet Muhammad never executed anyone for apostasy, nor encouraged his followers to do so. Criminalizing sacrilege isn’t based on Islam’s main sacred text, the Quran, either. It contains over 100 verses encouraging peace, freedom of conscience and religious tolerance.

In Chapter 2, Verse 256, the Quran states, “There is no coercion in religion.” Chapter 4, Verse 140 urges Muslims to simply leave blasphemous conversations: “When you hear the verses of God being rejected and mocked, do not sit with them.”

By using their political connections and historical authority to interpret Islam, however, the conservative ulema have marginalized more moderate voices.

Reaction to global Islamophobia

Debates about blasphemy and apostasy laws among Muslims are influenced by international affairs.

Across the globe, Muslim minorities – including the Palestinians under Israeli occupation, Chechens of Russia, Muslim Kashmiris of India, Rohingya of Myanmar and Uyghurs of China – have experienced persecution.

Several men and women, with faces covered, walk on a beach after being arrested.

The Rohingya of Myanmar are among several Muslim minorities facing persecution worldwide. Rakhine state, Myanmar, Jan. 13, 2020.
STR/AFP via Getty Images

Alongside persecution are some Western policies that discriminate against certain Muslims, such as laws prohibiting headscarves in schools.

Such laws and policies can create the impression that Muslims are under siege and provide an excuse for the belief that punishing sacrilege is a defense of the faith.

Instead, blasphemy laws have served political agendas of populist politicians and their religious supporters in Pakistan and some other Muslim countries.

Moreover, these laws contribute to anti-Muslim stereotypes about religious intolerance. Some of my Turkish relatives even discourage my work on this topic, fearing it fuels Islamophobia.

But my research shows that criminalizing blasphemy and apostasy is more political than it is religious. The Quran does not require punishing sacrilege: Authoritarian politics do.

This is an updated version of a piece first published on February 20, 2020.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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