{"id":3861,"date":"2026-03-08T19:11:38","date_gmt":"2026-03-08T19:11:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/iranians.global\/news\/?p=3861"},"modified":"2026-03-08T19:39:29","modified_gmt":"2026-03-08T19:39:29","slug":"espionage-cost-australia-12-5-billion-in-2023-24-asio-boss-mike-burgess-says","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/iranians.global\/news\/espionage-cost-australia-12-5-billion-in-2023-24-asio-boss-mike-burgess-says\/","title":{"rendered":"Espionage cost Australia $12.5 billion in 2023-24, ASIO boss Mike Burgess says"},"content":{"rendered":"

By Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra<\/strong><\/a> <\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

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Espionage cost Australia $12.5 billion in 2023-24, according to a study by ASIO and the Australian Institute of Criminology.<\/p>\n

The figure includes the direct costs of known espionage incidents, including state-sponsored theft of intellectual property, as well as the indirect costs of countering and responding. <\/p>\n

Details of the Cost of Espionage report were released by the head of ASIO, Mike Burgess, in delivering the annual Hawke Lecture on Thursday night. Espionage is defined as \u201cthe theft of Australian information by another country that is seeking an advantage over Australia\u201d.<\/p>\n

Burgess said the Institute estimated foreign cyber spies stole nearly $2 billion from Australian companies and businesses in trade secrets and intellectual property in 2023-24. <\/p>\n

In one instance, spies hacked into a major Australian exporters computer network, stealing commercially sensitive information. <\/p>\n

\u201cThe theft gave the foreign country a significant advantage in subsequent contract negotiations, costing Australia hundreds of millions of dollars.\u201d<\/p>\n

Burgess pointed to another espionage incident several years ago when an overseas delegation visited a sensitive Australian horticultural facility.<\/p>\n

A delegation member entered a restricted area and photographed a rare, valuable variety of fruit tree. A staff member intervened and deleted the image but it later turned out several of the tree\u2019s branches had been stolen and smuggled out of Australia. <\/p>\n

\u201cAlmost certainly, the stolen plant material allowed scientists in the other country to reverse engineer and replicate two decades of Australian research and development.\u201d<\/p>\n

In another instance, an Australian defence contractor invented and sold a world-leading innovation. <\/p>\n

At first sales boomed but then they collapsed, and \u201ccustomers began flooding the company\u2019s repair centre with faulty products. While the returns looked genuine, closer examination revealed they were cheap and nasty knock offs.<\/p>\n

“An investigation uncovered what happened.<\/p>\n

“One year earlier, a company representative attended a defence industry event overseas and was approached by an enthusiastic local. She insisted on sharing some content via a USB, which was inserted into a company laptop. The USB infected the system with malware allowing hackers to steal the blueprints for the product. <\/p>\n

“Almost certainly, the \u2018enthusiastic local\u2019 worked for a foreign intelligence service. The blueprints were given to a state-owned enterprise which mass-produced the knock-offs and deprived the Australian company millions of dollars in lost revenue \u2013 the tangible cost of espionage.\u201d<\/p>\n

Burgess said many entities do not realise their secrets have been stolen by espionage.<\/p>\n

He stressed the institute was deliberately conservative, only modelling costs it could confirm and calculate.<\/p>\n

\u201cThat means many of the most serious, significant and cascading costs of espionage are not included in the 12.5 billion dollar figure. The potential loss of strategic advantage, sovereign decision-making and warfighting capacity hold immense value, but not a quantifiable dollar value.\u201d<\/p>\n

\u201cThe Institute estimates Australia prevented tens of billions of dollars of additional costs by stopping or deterring spying,\u201d Burgess said.<\/p>\n

He said ASIO estimated the espionage threat \u201cwill only intensify. It is already more serious and sophisticated than ever before, so our response must also be more serious and sophisticated than ever before.\u201d <\/p>\n

Russian spies booted out in 2022<\/h2>\n

Burgess confirmed that in 2022 a number of \u201cundeclared Russian intelligence officers\u201d were removed from Australia.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe decision followed a lengthy ASIO investigation that found the Russians recruiting proxies and agents to obtain sensitive information, and employing sophisticated tradecraft to disguise their activities.\u201d<\/p>\n

Last year, two Russian born Australian citizens were charged with an espionage related offence. <\/p>\n

Russian remained a persistent and aggressive espionage threat, Burgess said. \u201cBut Russia is by no means the only country we have to deal with.<\/p>\n

“You would be genuinely shocked by the number and names of countries trying to steal our secrets.<\/p>\n

“The obvious candidates are very active \u2013 I\u2019ve previously named China, Russia and Iran \u2013 but many other countries are also targeting anyone and anything that could give them a strategic or tactical advantage, including sensitive but unclassified information.\u201d<\/p>\n

Burgess said increasingly foreign intelligence services were broadening their collection efforts beyond traditional categories. They were aggressively targeting science and technology, and public and private sector projects, negotiations and investments. This includes Antarctic research, green technology, critical minerals and rare earths extraction and processing. <\/p>\n

\u2018A very unhealthy\u2019 interest in AUKUS<\/h2>\n

Burgess said foreign intelligence services were \u201ctaking a very unhealthy interest in AUKUS and its associated capabilities.\u201d<\/p>\n

\u201cAustralia\u2019s defence sector is a top intelligence collection priority for foreign governments seeking to blunt our operational edge, gain insights into our operational readiness and tactics, and better understand our allies\u2019 capabilities.<\/p>\n

“Targets include maritime and aviation-related military capabilities, but also innovations with both commercial and military applications.<\/p>\n

“And with AUKUS, we are not just defending our sovereign capability. We are also defending critical capability shared by and with our partners.\u201d<\/p>\n

He said foreign intelligence services were \u201cproactive, creative and opportunistic\u201d in targeting present and former defence employees. <\/p>\n

There was relentless cyber espionage, in-person targeting and technical collection. <\/p>\n

\u201cIn recent years, for example, defence employees travelling overseas have been subjected to covert room searches, been approached at conferences by spies in disguise and given gifts containing surveillance devices.\u201d<\/p>\n

Two dozen major disruptions in the last three years<\/h2>\n

Burgess said that ASIO had detected and disrupted 24 major cases of foreign interference in the last three years alone. <\/p>\n

This was more than in the previous eight years combined. They were just the major disruptions – there were many other cases. Among the examples he gave were:<\/p>\n